

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080003-9

29 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski on the  
Intelligence Community Reorganization

1. Follow-up action to the PRC meeting. Brzezinski will send the President a memo that says:

a. There was general agreement on the need to establish some mechanism for creating priorities for the Intelligence Community. The exact definition of how this would be done was not resolved and a working group will be put to work on it.

b. There was general agreement on enhancement of the DCI's authority and tasking on budget control. There was sharp disagreement thereafter. Harold Brown indicated he thought this enhancement could come without assumption of line authority. I thought it would only come with line authority.

c. Attached will be papers from SecDef and myself, and an additional option provided by OMB which attempts to strike middle ground.

d. The six points around which the PRC discussions evolved were tasking, line authority, budget control, accountability, production and \_\_\_\_\_, but the conversation in the PRC concentrated on the first three.

e. The President should decide either to make a decision based on these papers to call a meeting with just SecDef and myself or to call an NSC meeting.

2. Brzezinski indicated that he would give Harold and myself until Tuesday morning to produce a substitute paper for the one we already have in. He indicated that he would not circulate those papers to the other party, at least until after they were both in.

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY DCI

Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080003-9

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080003-9

3. I suggested he try to reserve a time late next week on the President's calendar for the possibility of one of the two meetings recommended.

4. In the substantive discussion on the reorganization, I developed Brzezinski's primary objection to our plan. He feels that a DCI with three or four vice presidents underneath him will become simply a manager and not a substantive intelligence adviser. At the same time, he admits that the chief of intelligence must have tasking and budgetary control over the collection process. In effect, he would want the DCI to be the vice president for analysis, and at the same time direct the collection and budgetary areas though there is some vagueness as to just how much such direction would come from the DCI and how much from the NSC.

STANSFIELD TURNER  
Director

25X1

CC



Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080003-9

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080003-9

Approved For Release 2005/01/13 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003300080003-9